The energy shock triggered by the US-Israel war has reverberated across global markets with uncommon severity. For Pakistan, the disruption arrives at a particularly vulnerable moment. Summer brings a sharp surge in electricity demand driven by cooling needs, forcing the national grid to rapidly ramp up generation capacity.

Meeting these peak loads requires flexible, fast-response generation, principally the Re-gasified Liquefied Natural Gas (RLNG)-based peaker plants.

Pakistan maintains RLNG import contracts for 10 cargoes per month, with maximum capacity imported from Qatar. A research by the Policy Research Institute for Equitable Development shows a seasonal comparison of RLNG consumption that indicates, at 10 RLNG cargoes per month (≈29,885 MMCF), supply exceeds average monthly demand of 27,877 MMCF in summer and 21,700 MMCF in a winter month, where lower power demand offsets increased residential and heating use.

Under normal conditions, therefore, the supply from 10 cargoes broadly aligns with the country’s average monthly demand, allowing the system to remain relatively balanced, particularly when complemented by domestic gas supplies.

Also read: Arrival of second Qatari LNG tanker a major diplomatic achievement

However, the current situation presents a far more concerning outlook. Only two RLNG cargoes were received, as anticipated for March 2026, the available RLNG supply has fallen drastically (reaching about 5847 MMCF), much short of the country’s typical consumption requirements.

In the wake of such crises, the Government of Pakistan is looking to increase the utilisation of Thar coal. March 2026 dispatch shows the shift away from RLNG and toward coal: local coal generated 1,498 GWh,** imported coal 1,234 GWh, while RLNG fell to only 504 GWh. Together, coal supplied about 2,732 GWh, or 30.56% of the March generation.

Pakistan’s current generation mix, however, is structurally misaligned with this evolving demand profile. Coal-based plants, whether fuelled by imported coal or domestic Thar reserves, were designed for continuous baseload operation rather than rapid output adjustment unlike RLNG based generation plants which have a higher ramping up rate. However reliance on imported RLNG—exposed to volatile global markets—has constrained its role in the system.

While coal plants may offer some support in meeting increased baseload demand, especially with the shift of bulk industrial load to the grid that was previously fuelled by RLNG, they cannot easily replace the operational flexibility that RLNG-based plants provide without significant retrofitting.

The country thus finds itself at a difficult intersection: declining gas availability, volatile global fuel markets, and a generation fleet ill-suited to the demand patterns it must serve.

Industrial electricity demand adds another layer of complexity. According to the State of Industry Report 2025, approximately 23,963 GWh of electricity was sold to the industrial sector through the government-owned CPPA-G.** Energy-intensive industries such as textiles, chemicals, and manufacturing require uninterrupted supply around the clock. Solar generation is daylight-dependent; wind and hydropower are seasonal. Industrial feeders cannot absorb disruptions, as shutting down and restarting high-temperature processes carries prohibitive financial costs. Reliability, therefore, is non-negotiable for industrial consumers.

Pakistan’s real choice is not between coal and no coal; it is between repeatedly reacting to fuel crises and deliberately building a power system that is cleaner, more flexible, and less exposed to imported-fuel shocks.

This poses a question of strategic priority with no straightforward answer. Should Pakistan prioritise uninterrupted industrial supply, accepting the further exploitation of Thar coal reserves or worse, relying on imported coal (such as Sahiwal coal-power plant) in defence of national energy security? The recent reports on Sahiwal case particularly also exposes a second layer of vulnerability: even when coal is available as a substitute for LNG, imported-coal plants remain dependent on port logistics, railway wagons, foreign exchange, and long-distance fuel transport that caused major disruptions and forced government to reshuffle the freight transport team as reserves had dropped to only a few days of sufficiency. 

The alternative is to resist deepening its coal dependency and pursue cleaner and more reliable pathways. The decision sits at the intersection of economic competitiveness, resource sovereignty, and long-term environmental obligation.

Expanding coal-based generation particularly from Thar carries costs that extend well beyond fiscal considerations. The environmental, health, and social consequences of coal mining and combustion are substantial and well-documented. Communities in proximity to mining operations have often reported environmental degradation, respiratory illness, and disruption to traditional livelihoods.

The path forward requires deliberate, time-bound choices on part of the authorities. In the near term, a degree of reliance on Thar coal for baseload generation (as a buffer solution) may be unavoidable as RLNG supply remains constrained. However, two parallel investments are essential:  First, any continued coal use must be limited, time-bound and subject to stricter environmental standards, with higher-efficiency technologies used only to reduce fuel use and emissions intensity during the transition.

Second, and more urgently, battery storage infrastructure integrated with solar PV must be developed at utility-scale. Storage is not merely a route to greater self-sufficiency; it provides the ancillary grid services such as frequency regulation, peak shaving and spinning reserve that a flexible and reliable power system requires.

California’s record breaking battery discharge (12.3 GW) contributed to 42.8% of grid-demand in the evening peak which is equivalent to an output from 15-20 combined gas-cycle plants or 6 Hoover dams. Such examples portray how storage can play a role not only as a decarbonising asset but also as reliability and price-stabilising asset.Both investments demand timely decisions and sustained long-term commitment.

Pakistan’s energy challenge has matured beyond a simple fuel-choice question. It now reflects a deeper structural problem: reconciling rising electricity demand, industrial competitiveness, energy security in an unstable global market, and the environmental and social costs of domestic resource extraction. Pakistan’s real choice is not between coal and no coal; it is between repeatedly reacting to fuel crises and deliberately building a power system that is cleaner, more flexible, and less exposed to imported-fuel shocks.


The article does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Business Recorder or its owners.

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